Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
The discrepancy between theory-based predictions and observation-based patterns of international capital flows has been marked as one of the major failings of economic theory (Lucas, 1990) . According to the law of diminishing marginal returns, economic theory predicts that capital is supposed to flow from capital-rich countries to capital-poor countries. However, in the world of today what instead we do observe is a rich-rich affair in international finance.
Capital moves lavishly within the OECD region, but only barely between OECD countries and developing countries. Historically, this wasn't always so.
During the 'first age' of globalization, from 1870 to World War One (WWI), global capital mobility is said to have been more in line with economic theory than during the 'second age', a century later. As elaborately laid out in Obstfeld -Taylor (2005) , in the period prior to WWI many peripheral capitalpoor countries, above all the New World offshoots of Western Europe, enjoyed a rich and constant inflow of capital supplied exclusively by the then capitalrich West European Great Powers (that is, the then highly developed economies with low marginal product of capital).
Reasons, why theory did work then but does not work now, are plenty but the most telling ones are provided by new institutional economics (NIE). Due to this school of thought economic principles linked to international capital transactions only work if poor peripheral countries share (or converge to) the very social and legal norms that are determinant for rich core countries (i.e., strong protection of property rights). This view has forcefully been forwarded more recently, among others, by economic historians such as N. Ferguson (Ferguson, 2003) and by theoretical economists such as D. Acemoglu (Acemoglu, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2002) , respectively. The former provide evidence that many of the capital-attracting periphery countries in the late 19 th century were imperial outposts of the rich European core countries and, thus, shared with them the same legal norms and business culture. The latter authors argue that the early European settlers immigrating to the then sparsely populated, low-developed regions of the Americas and Australia in days of old brought with them institutions of governance and business culture that strongly protected property rights thereby laying the groundwork for long-run economic growth in these 'remote regions'. Growth that still keeps unfolding.
With the fall of the 'Iron Curtain' in the late 1980s and the swift transformation of the former communist command economies to full-fledged market economies (Westernization of Eastern Europe), history has now provided new institutional economists with another rare and historically unique opportunity to put NIE core propositions to the test within the frame of a natural experiment (that still is evolving for our very eyes). Viewed from the perspective of highly developed countries such as Austria, a further piece of intriguing 'geographical economics' (and politics) also comes into play. For example, Austria shares with former command economies (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) not only almost two thirds of its border but also the heritage of a common cultural and political past (until 1918, the Habsburg Empire reached far East for centuries). Thus, common cultural roots may matter if it comes to explaining extended cross-border activities between Austria and its neighboring Eastern European countries.
In this paper we make an attempt to apply the NIE-based approach to explore one of the core questions in international banking, namely, to what extent culture, geography and institutions matter as prime mover of cross-border bank lending. Theory suggests that bank lending is facilitated, among other things, by low information and transactions costs (see, for example, Freixas -Rochet, 2008 Even though transaction and information costs play a role in all forms of capital movements, they are most decisive in facilitating cross-border bank lending. Borrowers living and working in their home country have the decisive advantage over their cross-border lenders in that they operate in a social and legal environment they are most likely more familiar with than the lenders, and, most importantly, in case of legal dispute they are most likely provided with a hardly catchable edge on their lenders. However, this borrowers' advantage tapers off the smaller is the gap between the lenders' and the borrowers' legal and social environment and the stronger is the mutual recognition of both cross-border lenders' and borrowers' rights and duties in the respective judiciaries. Again, this 'culture gap' may be smaller among neighboring countries than among countries that are far apart. Beyond question, cultural mismatch is definitely smaller among neighboring countries that share a long-lasting common past. Thus, banks are of course more inclined ).
1 ) Both casual observation and profound analysis confirm that a broad and constant flow of West European capital has been pouring into this region ever since the change of regime in 1989 (see, for example, Prasad et al., 2006; Abiad et al., 2009; and Maechler -Ong, 2009). to provide cross-border loans when they are close to their clienteles both geographically and culturally (that is, when the cultural and/or institutional gap on their customers is sufficiently small or negligible). The latter has apparently occurred, in the recent past, between the European Union and many Eastern European countries in general, and between Austria and its neighboring countries to the east, in particular. 
2.
Stylized Facts: Cross-border Bank Lending -Common Cultural Roots, Geographical Proximity and Institutional Convergence A third piece of stylized evidence is provided in Figure 3 . Even though we slightly change time windows in this graph it nevertheless becomes evident that it is the eastern region of Austria, particularly those districts close to the state border where the hot spots in terms of cross-border bank lending activities have been from about 2000 onwards. Finally, Figure 4 is to reflect the long-lasting cultural proximity between the Eastern border regions of Austria and the adjacent regions across the border.
We consider the prevalence of Austrian residents with surname of Czech, Slovakian, Hungarian, and Slovenian ancestry relative to the prevalence of residents with surname of Austro-German origin, per district, to be an adequate measure of 'metering' the common cultural past of the eastern region of Austria and its neighboring countries 2 2 ) For the definition of the Eastern European surname descent ratio, see the Appendix. This indicator has been computed with the help of Angela Bergermayer and Axel Linsberger, both of whom specialize in Slavonic onomatology at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Lexicography of Austrian Dialects and Names, Vienna. This 'far from likely' encounter of economics and onomastics has given birth to a very interesting research program aimed at testing the water to what extent both disciplines can join forces to their mutual benefit.
). Since the selected Slavonic surnames have already become well established in Austria for more than a century (that is, the chosen Eastern European surnames have already become a household name in Habsburg Austria due to migration of Slavonic subjects to the region that forms now the eastern area of the Republic of Austria) we conclude that their prevalence in Austria bear witness for the common cultural heritage Figure 3 indicating that cross-border bank lending activities tend to be more dynamic in districts with a higher Eastern European surname descent ratio and, thus, with a 'higher degree' of common, transnational culture.
)
Migration of Czech, Slovakian, Hungarian and Slovenian citizens to Austria since the fall of the Iron Curtain has been minor and, hence, cannot be related to the higher prevalence of Slavonic names in the eastern regions of Austria. Hence, this indicator has all the properties a good instrument variable should have. For an alternative approach to measuring cultural integration, see Grosjean, (2011A, 2011B) . Austrian districts
Econometric Analysis and Findings

Data and Variables
To check the proposed hypothesis we use a sample consisting of a balanced panel of annual report data of 543 Austrian banks (unfortunately, access to quarterly or monthly data was not made possible). The bank data were extracted from non-consolidated income statement and balance sheet data ranging over 1995 to 2008. The data have been deflated by the GDP deflator (2005=100) and adjusted for inconsistent data-related outliers, respectively 4 ).
The dataset is unique in the sense that it provides almost full coverage of
Austrian regional banking at the individual bank level. We will use this specific balanced dataset for all empirical tests conducted in this paper 5
Since the aim of the paper is to find causes for cross-border lending activities since 1995 we confine the dataset to small and regional banks that do not run subsidiaries abroad. Hence, the data set does not include the larger Austrian banks (with a strong foothold in Eastern Europe in the form of subsidiary companies). The exclusion of the larger Austrian banks from analysis does not lessen the scope of the findings drawn from our data set. Quite the contrary, since the larger banks, all of which all-finance groups, tend to provide financial services on site by setting up operating local units (that is, foreign subsidiaries or foreign branches), they have restrained from engaging in cross-border lending on a notable scale altogether.
).
In order to evaluate the differences in cross-border lending among various regional banks we classify the overall data set according to three regional subareas. That is, districts that are home to regional banks located along the border to the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia are pooled to a homogenous regional entity. Interior districts, that is, districts whose borders 4 ) Since we were granted access to the balance sheet and income statement of all Austrian banks, we subjected the reported data at the company level to simple accounting-based consistency checks. If a bank failed this test (i.e., due to incomplete or inconsistent data reporting), it was excluded from the analysis. In order to check for remaining outliers, we consistently apply estimation techniques which are sensitive to outliers. In the econometric analysis to come, the time- The ratio "foreign assets divided by total assets" at the bank level lagged one period, denoted laaq , as do all idiosyncratic variables in this study.
)
Since foreign assets as percent of total assets is bounded by zero and one we convert the dependent variable into this unbounded variable in order to circumvent cumbersome estimation hurdles that come with estimators for truncated dependent variables.
Due to legal data protection requirements Austrian Central Bank (OeNB) is only eligible to provide access to foreign lending data at the bank level when wrapped up in the sum of all foreign activities on the asset side. However, informal information provided by both bank managers and bank supervisory experts ensures us that the ratio of foreign assets over total assets at the bank level follows very closely the dynamics of foreign bank lending over total assets at the bank level. This particularly applies to the regionally operating banks that are at the center of this analysis.
To control for individual bank size, which is frequently associated with a bank's inclination to become international, we use total real assets The quality of a bank's personnel may also be a driving factor behind the tendency to lend cross-border. In the following, the skills level of a bank's employees, denoted by ). The former, because wellcapitalized banks are assumed to be capable of coping with the assumed higher risks in the foreign markets and, in so doing, to be rewarded with handsome profits. The latter, because undercapitalized banks may have an extra-strong incentive for playing in (riskier) foreign markets with the aim to improve the odds of raising capital (by reaping and retaining the 'wished-for-extra-profit'). We relate core capital to total assets rather than to risk-weighted assets, as suggested by the Basel Accords, since data on the latter have not been available for all regional banks under study. management affects cross-border lending positively (negatively) then this variable is to enter into the regressions equations with a negative (positive) sign.
In addition, we checked the empirical relevance of various indicators designed to capture external demand and supply factors likely to affect cross-border bank lending activities. In controlling for these external demand and supply factors we primarily concentrated on growth rate spreads, as measured by the difference of real GDP per capita growth rates between Austria and its neighboring eastern countries, and interest rate spreads, as measured by the difference of nominal 3-month money market reference interest rates between Austria and its neighboring eastern countries, respectively. Since these indicators have proven to have no explanation power in the regressions, we refrain from introducing them altogether.
For further data details, we refer the reader to the Appendix.
Model and Test
The base regression model used to check if institutional and legal convergence of Austria's eastern neighboring countries towards EU standards has had an impact on the dynamics of cross-border lending activities of Austrian regional banks has the following structure: Hausman-Taylor estimator. This estimator is an instrument-variable based approach and is built on the (somewhat) narrowing assumption that some specified regressors be uncorrelated with the fixed effects (see, CameronTrivedi, 2010, p. 290) . The validity of the latter assumption will be tested by the Sargan-Hansen test.
Findings
The estimates for various versions of equation ) 1 ( gained from the HausmanTaylor estimator are presented in Table 1 . For all versions presented the chosen specification assumes that The same applies to management efficiency as measured by the cost-income ratio t i CIR , . However, the latter coefficient estimates are far closer to standard significance levels, with estimates in model 3 and model 6 being significant at the critical p-value of 10 percent. Thus, these estimates indicate that it is rather the inefficiently managed regional bank that is more likely to venture across border.
These findings prove to be rather robust as results for the various models show.
Finally, as mentioned above, it is worth reminding that the inclusion of additional domestic and foreign real demand and real supply factors has not significantly increased the explanatory value of the regression models presented.
Conclusion
With the fall of the 'Iron Curtain' in the late 1980s and the swift transformation Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) to EU norms. In addition, we found -19 - evidence that cultural closeness between Austria and its Eastern European neighboring countries, as measured by a 'common culture indicator' built on the relative prevalence of Slavonic names in Austria at the district level, has also contributed to elevate cross-border lending of small-sized to medium-sized Austrian banks, located along the eastern border, to residents of the neighboring countries in the East. We consider this outcome as a piece of evidence that is strongly in line with the view that geographical closeness, common culture and common institutions matter when it comes down to making economic laws work.
